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ABSTRACT 
Mobile  agent  plays  an  important  role  in  developing  applications  of  open,  distributed  and  mixed 
environments, such as the internet. Mobile agent or mobile software agent is piece of software that can 
operate autonomously to accomplish user assigned task. To explain more, mobile agent is the process which 
can migrate to hosts autonomously. As an agent travels to do execution in different environment in different 
host or servers, the agents are in need of protecting themselves and their data from various types of attacks. 
So providing security to the mobile agent (static code) and its data (dynamic code) is an emerging need in 
Mobile Agent Technology. The change in Mobile Agent (MA) code can be identified due its static nature 
where as finding change in mobile agent data is the biggest challenge especially in malicious host’s attacks. 
This study presents Clone Return Process (CRP) method to protect the data of free roaming mobile agent 
against colluded truncation attack. By using CRP, malicious host are identified and recovery of mobile 
agent  is  easily  done.  So  free  roaming  mobile  agent  communicates  with  other  servers  and  protects  its 
computation results (data) in an efficient way. 
  
Keywords: Mobile Agent, Free Roaming, Protection, Attacks, Data Security, Code Integrity, Data Integrity, 
Migration Code, Aglets  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile agent is a emerging paradigm for Distributed 
Computing.  Mobile  Agent  has  been  developed  quickly 
and widely used by researcher to satisfy many distributed 
applications (Wang et al., 2011). The software programs 
that live in computer networks are called mobile agents 
which  have  the  feature  of  autonomy,  social  ability, 
learning and most important mobility. They can migrate 
from one host to another host to perform computations for 
fulfilling  the  goals  of  the  user.  Comparison  of  mobile 
agent  technology  with  traditional  methods  is  shown  in 
Table 1. Free roaming mobile agents is a kind of mobile 
agent that roams in the network to do task of its owner 
without any given itinerary path. 
When a mobile agent decides to migrate, it saves its 
own state and transports this saved state to next host and 
resume  execution  from  the  saved  state  on  the  remote 
host.  In  strong  mobility  mobile  agents  resumes  its 
execution at exact the state where it stops the execution 
in  previous  host  where  as  in  Weak  mobility,  mobile 
agents does not resume its execution at same state where 
it stops the execution in previous host. 
Figure  1  describes  the  General  the  mobile  agent 
system which consists of Home Sever (originator), Mobile 
Agent and Server (The host that MA moves). The agent 
starts  its  execution  after  it  reaches  server.  There  is  no 
communication  between  home  server  and  other  severs 
except the server next to originator and last server.  
A mobile agent consists of three components shown in 
Fig. 2. Those are Code (program that defines the agent's 
behavior), State (the agent's internal variables which allow it 
to  resume  its  actions  after  moving  to  another  host)  and 
Attributes  (information  about  its  origin,  owner,  agent 
identity  Ia,  its  movement  history,  data  di,  resource 
requirements and authentication keys). Mobile Agent can 
access  the  attributes  but  it  cannot  modify  them.  Model 
notations and cryptographic notations are shown in Table 2. Geetha, G. and C. Jayakumar / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1207-1215, 2014 
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Table 1.  Comparison  of  mobile  agent  technology  with  traditional 
methods 
Paradigms  Mobile  Remote   Client 
/attributes  agent   evaluation   server  
Implementation  Hard  Easy   Very easy 
Security  Very low   Low   Very high 
Performance   High very   High   Low  
Mobility of elements 
a) Data  semi mobile  static mobile   mobile 
b) Code  Mobile  Mobile   Static 
c) Stack  Mobile  Mobile  Static 
Itinerary  Static/dynamic  Static/dynamic  Static 
Mobility   Code to data   Code to data   Data to code 
Platform   Dependent   Independent   independent 
Programming code  Hard   Hard   Easy 
Tool   Aglets   Aglets   CORBA 
 
Table 2. Model notations and cryptographic notations 
Si   i
th the host  
Di   Data collected at Si  
ED   Enhanced data  
OD   out data  
Enc PbS0   Encryption using Public key of originator S0  
Sig   Encryption using Private key of originator Si  
EHcodei   Encrypted hash code foe mobile code at i
th host  
H(x)   Hash of X  
Msg   Message  
α   Threshold value for data size  
β   Threshold value for host count  
γ   Threshold value for execution time  
HC   Host count  
Ttot   Total execution time  
t exe i   Execution time of Si  
t tra i   Time taken travel from Si-1 to S
i  
σ   Delay time  
τ, υ   Constants  
α   Threshold value for data size  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Migration of Mobile Agent from originator to various hosts 
 
 
Fig. 2. Components of Mobile Agents 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Application example-Mobile agent as data collect 
 
1.1. Security Issues in Mobile Agents  
Though Mobile agent moves from one host to another 
host in Network, the security of mobile agent plays wide 
role  in  mobile  agent  technology.  The  Mobile  agent 
security can be classified as follows Fig. 3. 
In  Fig.  4,  it  is  clearly  shown  the  classification  of 
mobile agent Security. In another aspect i.e., according 
to attackers of agent Security classified as: 
·  Malicious Host Attacks the Agent 
·  Malicious Agent Attacks Agent 
·  Others Attacks the Agent 
Here  the  security  of  agent  platform  is  not 
mentioned due to focus the study of Data security in 
free  Roaming  the  Mobile  agent  from  attack  of 
malicious Host. 
Malicious  Host  May  try  to  tamper  the  mobile 
agent’s Static code(agent program) or Dynamic code 
(data)  even  Both  while  the  agent  is  in  migration  to 
process  computational  results(data  of  agent).  To 
provide  secure  agent  execution  in  various  host  or 
severs,  the  Security  of  agent  mechanism  divide  into 
two major categories as follows: 
·  Detection mechanism 
·  Avoiding mechanism Geetha, G. and C. Jayakumar / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1207-1215, 2014 
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Fig. 4. Classification of mobile Agent system Security 
 
1.2. Detection Mechanism  
To find wether the host is malicious host or not, the 
methods used are: 
·  Trusted Third Party (TTP) 
·  Chain relation method 
·  Multi agent co operating mechanism 
1.3. Trusted Third Party (TTP) 
TTP  is  used  to  protect  the  mobile  agent’s  data  by 
recording  itinerary  information  directly  or  indirectly. 
Mobile agents need at least on TTP to communicate for 
their execution and protection. 
1.4. Chain Relation Method  
Mobile agents form a chain relation among the previous 
and the following hosts where they compute and collect 
data. If a malicious host modifies the data, the mobile 
agents  can  detect  the  modification  through  this  chain 
relation.  Different  chain  relations  with  different 
mechanisms  used  to  detect  various  attacks  especially 
colluded truncation attacks.  
1.5. Multi Agent Co Operating Mechanism  
More  than  one  agent  involves  in  mobile  agent 
applications. Mobile agents are classified in to different 
classes. For example Task agent, secondary agent, data 
computation agents, data collection agents.  
1.6. Avoiding Mechanism  
This Mechanism gives idea of that the agent should 
not move to malicious host or un trusted host to protect 
the  data.  To  list  Avoiding  mechanism  used  in  Mobile 
Agent Technology, we have: 
·  Trust computing 
·  Dynamic interaction 
·  Private Key consignment 
1.7. Trust Computing 
In  Trusted  computing,  mobile  agent  execution  is 
based on trust and reputation values of the host. Trust 
values  of  host  are  calculated  by  various  methods  to 
protect mobile agent and its data. 
1.8. Dynamic Interaction 
During  the  Information  collected  the  interaction  an 
environment key is generated. That key allows to infer 
the host‘s trust degree and permits the mobile agent to 
adapt its execution. 
1.9. Private Key Consignment 
Private Key Consignment method protects the private 
key  of  the  agent  by  consigning  the  private  key  to  a 
tamper  proof  hardware  which  enables  convenient  and 
secure use of the private key. 
In rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
discusses a background on the threats and some related 
works  on  mobile  agent  security.  Section  3  is  about 
security requirements of mobile agent systems. Section 4 
offers  a  detailed  description  of  the  proposed  protocol. 
Section 5 presents implementation details of the protocol 
and  an  analysis.  As  a  conclusion,  section  6  presents 
synthesis of work and its limitations. 
1.10. Related Works  
Methods used to protect mobile agents data includes:  
·  Partial Results Authentication Code (PRAC)  
·  Set authentication code  
·  Ring signature  
·  Chan hash chaining  
Partial Result Authentication Code (PRAC) proposed to 
ensure the  integrity of data  collected  from  hosts by  Yee 
(1997). In this agent and its originator maintain a list of 
secret  keys  or  key  generation  function  used  to  calculate 
Message  Authentication  Code (MAC)  upon the result of 
each host. The agent uses a key to encapsulate the collected 
offer and destroys the key. Yee defines forward integrity in 
which  the  first  visited  malicious  host  cannot  modify  or 
forge any PRACs of previously visited hosts. 
Extended  from  of  Yee’s  Partial  Result 
Authentication Code (PRAC) is KAG method which 
proposed  by  Karjoth  et  al.  (1998).  In  KAG,  each  host 
generates a signing key for its successor and certifies the 
corresponding  verification  key.  Using  the  received Geetha, G. and C. Jayakumar / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1207-1215, 2014 
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signature/verification key pair, a host signs its partial result 
and certifies a new verification key for the next host. 
Marikkannu et al. (2011) developed a protocol, which 
is immune to most types of known attacks. The protocol 
uses the techniques of trip  marking, digital signing and 
MIP, to overcome most types of attacks. Enhanced KAG 
Scheme is proposed by Cheng and Wei (2002) to Defend 
two colluder truncation attack. In this scheme, a host is 
first required to get a counter signature of its partial result 
from its predecessor before sending it to the next host. 
Linna  and  Jun  (2010)  proposed  the  Signature  Trust 
Chain Mechanism (STCM) in which data was encrypted as 
a whole for protection and identity information was sent to 
trusted third party to resist any attack. This mechanism uses 
the TTP for verification. In this mechanism two types of 
agents are used. It compares the path of the collected data 
with path of identity information. If any mismatch occurs 
the host will identify that there is an attack. 
Method to use integrity measurement feature and the 
integrity  reporting  feature  is  proposed  by  Silei  et  al. 
(2008). In this Integrity measurement is the process of 
obtaining  metrics  of  platform  characteristics  where  as 
integrity reporting is the process of attesting to integrity. 
But  this  mechanism  has  two  agents,  task  agent  and 
secondary agent platform configuration register. 
Signature  Trust  Chain  Mechanism  is  proposed 
Linna and Jun (2010). In STCM data was encrypted in 
to  a  whole  for  protection  and  sending  identity 
information to trusted third  party to resist attack. This 
mechanism use TTP for Verification. 
Songsiri  (2005)  proposed  method  using  TTP  for 
protecting data of mobile agents. It has two protocols: 
Online TTP and off line TTP. Again this method is in 
need of TTP. 
The  agents  transfer  commitments  to  other  Co-
operating Agents method is described by Roth (2001) in 
which those agents performs task like storing gathering 
and verifying But idea behind this approach is TTP. 
A Security protocol that protects mobile agents from 
malicious  platform  attacks  through  the  use  of  reference 
clone is proposed by Benachenhou and Pierre (2006). This 
clone, a copy of the agent is executed on trusted servers in 
parallel in order to verify the mobile agent execution. 
Software  architecture  by  Garrigues  et  al.  (2010)  is 
based  on  implementing  agent-driven  approach  using. 
That provides Mobile Agents with a code that manages 
their own protection and execution. That code is referred 
to as the agents control code. 
Raji and Ladani (2010) proposed a protocol in any 
host  cannot  learn  either  the  true  identity  of  the  agent 
owner, or the path that the agent has traversed through so 
far and both of the agent execution results and the agent 
itinerary are maintained in the agent state in such a way 
that its owner can only be aware of them. 
Two advanced models are proposed by Venkatesan and 
Chellappan  (2010b)  for  platform  and  agent  code 
protection with the policy and the additional signature to 
improve  the  efficiency  of  the  existing  Malicious 
Identification  Police  model  for  scanning  the  incoming 
agent to detect the malicious activities and to overcome 
the  availability  of  vulnerabilities  in  the  existing  Root 
Canal algorithm for code integrity checks. 
Senthilnathan  and  Purusothaman  (2012)  presents 
the results depicting the advantageous of using agents 
in data replication, which includes reduction in data 
communication  cost  under  different  circumstances 
like change in mobility of nodes, read write ratio of 
nodes and replication schema. 
Ogunnusi and Razak (2013) proposes a fault-tolerant 
key  distribution  protocol  for  distributed  mobile  agents 
(communicating entities) in network intrusion detection 
system  to  facilitate  hitch-free  collaboration  geared 
towards  intrusive  packets  detection  in  Wireless  Local 
Area Network (WLAN). 
From  the  above  analysis,  several  methods  are 
proposed to protect mobile agent, mobile agent data and 
mobile agent itinerary. Each and every mechanism has 
its own strength and weakness with reference to different 
environments.  But  all  proposed  mechanisms  fail  to 
protect mobile agent against colluded truncation attack. 
In this study, Clone Return Process method is proposed 
to  protect  mobile  agent,  mobile  agent’s  data  and  its 
itinerary against all  most all type of attacks especially 
colluded truncation attack. 
1.11. Security Requirements  
Mobile  agent  security  rests  on  Confidentiality, 
integrity and availability as like computer security.  
1.12. Confidentiality  
Confidentiality is the concealment of information or 
resources.  
1.13. Data Confidentiality  
Data  confidentiality  defines  the  protection  of  data 
from  unauthorized  disclosure.  The  originator  (host  on 
agent  created)  only  can  obtain  data  which  computed 
from other hosts. 
1.14. Forward Privacy 
The originator can only extract the visited host’s 
integrity. Geetha, G. and C. Jayakumar / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1207-1215, 2014 
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1.15. Integrity 
Integrity refers to trustworthiness of data or resource 
which  should  be  prevented  from  improper  or 
unauthorized  change.  Integrity  includes  data  integrity, 
origin integrity.  
1.16. Data Integrity 
Data Integrity is an assurance that data received are 
as exactly as calculated and sent by the host to which 
agent  has  moved  on.  So  the  intermediate  host  cannot 
modify, insert delete previous host’s data  
1.17. Code Integrity 
Code Integrity is a assurance that code received are 
exactly as the code sent by the originator (host in which 
agent has created). So intermediate host cannot modify, 
insert delete code of mobile agent.  
1.18. Authentication  
Authentication  provides  assurance  that  source  of 
received  data is  as  claimed.  So  that  any  host  where 
agent  migrates  should  authenticate  the  data  which 
computed on its platform. 
1.19. Anti-Insertion-Attack 
Any host cannot have the data to insert redundant data.  
1.20. Truncation Resilience  
The  chain  of  encapsulated  offer  can  be  broken  in 
between colluded malicious hosts.  
1.21. Malicious Host Identification:  
The  originator  can  identify  the  malicious  host  by 
verifying the chain of encapsulated offer. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Clone return process method 
1.22. Availability  
Availability refers to the ability to use the information or 
resource  desired.  Attempts  to  block  availability  called 
denial of service attacks.  
1.23. Non-Repudiation  
Non-repudiation  provides  protection  against  denial 
by one of the entities involved in a communication. So 
that no host which agent has moved on can deny data 
results computed on them and agent's passing through.  
1.24. The Proposed Protocol  
The proposed Clone Return Process Method (CRP) 
consists of agent migration, code integrity verification, 
data collection, encryption and hashing, signing, threshold 
checking, cloning and returning (Fig. 5). Instead returning 
to originator after migration to n host, the mobile agent can 
interact  with originator in between the collection of data 
from other servers based on some threshold: 
1) Creation of mobile Agent at S0  
  i. Hcode = H(Agent Byte Code)  
  ii. EHcode0 = EPR0 (Hcode)  
  iii. S0 →Si: EHcode0  
2) Execution of mobile Agent at Remote host Si  
  i. Received Hcode = DPUi-1(EHcode i)  
  ii. Hcode = H(Agent Byte Code)  
  iii. If (Received Hcode == Hcode) then  
  A. ODi-1 = EDi-1|| H(EDi-1)  
  B. If (Received H(EDi-1)=H(Received EDi-1))  
B.1. Collect Di  
B.2. EDi = EPU0 (Si|| Si+1||Sig (Di)|| H(D)i|| ODi-1)  
B.3. ODi=EDi|| H(EDi)  
B.4. EHcode = EPRi (Hcode)  
B.5. If threshold checking is not true  
  B.5.1. Si→Si+1: EHcodei||ODi  
  Else  
  B.5.2. Si → S0: ODi  
  B.5.3 Si →Si+1: EHcodei || ODi  
  Else  
  Si → S0: Msg (previous data mismatch)  
  Else  
  Si → S0: Msg (Error code)  
Three  types  of  protocols  are  used  based  on  the 
different  constrains  for  returning  to  the  originator. 
Threshold  Values  α,  β,  γ  is  chosen  for  Data  size  (α), 
number of host to be migrated (β) and execution time (γ). 
After retrieving the data from other host it verifies the 
threshold value. The mobile agent either migrates to the 
next server or does both the process migrating to the next Geetha, G. and C. Jayakumar / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1207-1215, 2014 
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sever  as  well  as  to  the  originator  by  cloning  if  the 
threshold value is reached. Clone  Agent  will return to 
originator  with  partial  data  and  the  original  agent 
migrates to the next server.  
1.25. Data Size as Threshold  
The mobile agent migrates to N number of host to 
collect data from each host. After migrating to N number 
of host the agent will collect the data for processing in 
the originator. While executing code in unknown severs, 
the agent  may  face  various types of attacks especially 
multi  colluded  truncation  attack.  Confidentiality  and 
Integrity  must  be  ensured  when  the  mobile  agent 
migrates  to  other  severs  or  host  to  collect  data.  To 
provide  the  above  mentioned  security  features  the 
collected data is signed, encrypted and attached with the 
hash value of the encrypted data in each host: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
i PU0 i i 1 PRi i i 1 i
i i i
i i 1 i
ED  E S  S Sig D  H D  OD
OD  H  ED ||  ED
S S :OD
+ -
+
=
=
®
 
 
Before each  migration the  mobile agent checks  for 
the threshold value (i.e.,) data size α. The threshold value 
is compared with the collected data size i.e., ODi. Based 
on the comparison the mobile agent either migrates or 
does both migration and cloning:  
  If α > size of(ODi) then  
  Migrate to next host  
  Else  
  {  
  Calculate α = α+ size of (ODi) or α = α+ constant τ  
  Does cloning  
  Return clone agent to originator with partial data  
  Migrate to next host  
  }   (1) 
1.26. Host Count as Threshold  
The mobile agent migrates to N number of host to 
collect  data  from  each  host.  The  mobile  agent  can 
interact with the originator after β hosts for preventing 
itself from various attacks. Initially the HC will be 0.  
After  visiting  each  host,  the  host  count  HC  is 
incremented by one: 
  
HC  HC  1 = +  
 
Before migrating to the next host, the mobile agent 
verifies its threshold value β. Based on the value of β and 
HC, the agent either migrates to the next host or does 
cloning and migration:  
  If β>HC then  
  Migrate to next host  
  Else  
  {  
  Calculate HC = HC +1  
  Does cloning  
  Return clone agent to originator with partial data  
  Migrate to next host  
  HC = 0  
  }  (2) 
1.27. Execution Time as Threshold  
The mobile agent takes texe time to execute its code 
in  each  host  and  ttra  time  to  travel  from  one  host  to 
another host. Total execution time: 
 
tot exei rai T = t + t
σ – delay time
s +s ∑ ∑  
 
The mobile agent may clone and return based on the 
threshold time γ. In each host after execution the total 
execution  time  Ttot  is  calculated  based  on  the  above 
formula. If total time Ttot exceeds the threshold value γ 
then  the  agent  communicates  with  the  originator  by 
cloning and return the partial data: 
 
  If γ<Ttot then  
  Migrate to next host  
  Else  
  {Calculate γ = γ + Ttot or α = α+ constant υ  
  Does cloning  
  Return clone agent to originator with partial data  
  Migrate to next host  
  }   (3) 
1.28. Experimentations  
Mobile  Agent  is  usually  implemented  for  a 
distributed  application  of  information  retrieval  from 
large number of database residing in remote servers. The 
data  retrieved  from  the  remote  servers  are  securely 
transmitted until it reaches the originator.  
Here a typical e-commerce application of e-ticketing 
is  chosen.  i.e.,  single  client  searching  for  information 
about  a  finding  convenient  price  from  the  catalogs  of 
several on line travel agencies. The client requires highly 
customized  query,  which  is  not  supported  by  the 
standard  query  interface  of  on  line  shop.  Such  query 
would require the client to fetch a relevant subset catalog 
and implement a search at its end.  Geetha, G. and C. Jayakumar / Journal of Computer Science 10 (7): 1207-1215, 2014 
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1.29. Aglets  
The  Clone  Return  Process  is  experimented  using 
IBM  Aglet.  Aglet  is  Mobile  Agent  framework  which 
supports interoperability  Aglet  was developed by IBM 
Tokyo Research Laboratory and is now open source. An 
Aglet is a composite Java object that includes mobility 
and persistence and its own thread of execution. Aglets 
uses  a  call-back  model  based  on  the  Java  event 
delegation model. Various action and mobility interfaces 
are  supported  by  Aglets  framework  which  determine 
what to do when a specific event happens.  
An Aglet interacts with its environment through an 
Aglet  Context  object.  Aglets  are  always  executed  in 
Aglet Contexts. To interact with each other, Aglets go 
through Aglet Proxy objects. An Aglet Proxy object acts 
as an interface of an Aglet and provides a common way 
of  accessing  the  Aglet  behind  it.  In  a  way,  an  Aglet 
Proxy object becomes the shield that protects an agent 
from malicious agents.  
Agent  Transfer  Protocol  (ATP)  is  a  simple 
application-level protocol designed to transmit an agent 
in an agent system-independent manner. An ATP request 
consists of a request line, header fields and content. The 
request line specifies the method of the request, while the 
header fields contain the parameters of the request. ATP 
defines the following four standard requests methods: 
·  Dispatch:  The  dispatch  method  requests  a 
destination agent system to reconstruct an agent 
from  the  content  of  a  request  and  to  start 
executing the agent. If the request is successful, 
the  sender  must  terminate  the  agent  and  release 
any resources consumed by it 
·  Retract: The retract method requests a destination 
agent system to send a specified agent back to the 
sender.  The  receiver  is  responsible  for 
reconstructing  and  resuming  the  agent.  If  the 
agent  is  successfully  transferred,  the  receiver 
must  terminate  the  agent  and  release  any 
resources consumed by it 
·  Fetch:  The  fetch  method  is  similar  to  the  GET 
method in HTTP; it requests a receiver to retrieve 
and  send  any  identified  information  (normally 
class files) 
·  Message:  The  message  method  is  used  to  pass  a 
message to an agent identified by an agent-id and to 
return a reply value in the response. Although the 
protocol adopts a request/reply form, it does not lay 
down  any  rules  for  a  scheme  of  communication 
between agents 
1.30. Experimental Setup  
The  Clone  Return  Process  is  implemented  on  8 
terminals  of  Pentium  IV  core  2deo,  2.67  GHZ,  1  GB 
RAM connected through a 10mbps LAN.  
For secure migration of mobile agent, the following 
advanced levels of cryptographic algorithms are used:  
·  Elliptic Curve Cryptography  
·  RSA 
·  SHA1 
·  Digital Signature 
The following parameters are considered for comparing 
the performance of the implementation strategy:  
·  Database size 
·  Size of the data retrieved  
·  Processing time 
·  Number of hosts 
·  Key size  
In this turnaround time is taken as the performance 
metric. Turnaround time is the time that elapsed between 
posting the request and receiving the results. This time 
includes  agent  creation,  migration  to  other  servers, 
information  retrieval  and  the  time  to  process  for 
extracting the required data. CRP is given better results 
with respect to Performance and Security.  
1.31. Security Analysis  
1.31.1. Confidentiality  
1.31.2. Data Confidentiality  
As the retrieved data is encrypted with the public key 
of the originator, only the originator can decrypt the data 
for  processing.  As  only  the  host  in  which  the  mobile 
agent  was  created  can  obtain  the  data  computed  from 
other  hosts,  the  protection  of  data  from  unauthorized 
disclosure was ensured: 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) i PU0 i i 1 PRi i i 1 i ED E   S  S Sig D  H D  OD + - =
 
 
1.32. Forward Privacy  
The encrypted data and hash of the data are appended 
with pervious collected offers and it is processed with 
public  key  cryptography.  Hence  the  malicious  host 
cannot  discover  the  pervious  host’s  address  and  data 
which implies forward privacy: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) i PU0 i i 1 PRi i i 1 i ED E   S  S Sig D  H D OD + - =
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1.33. Integrity  
1.33.1. Data Integrity  
The retrieved data is digitally signed and hashed. The 
enhanced data is appended with pervious collected offers 
and it is processed with public key cryptography. Thus 
the  malicious  host  cannot  change  the  pervious  host’s 
address and data: 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) i PU0 i i 1 PRi i i 1 i ED E   S  S Sig D  H D OD + - =  
1.34. Code Integrity  
Code Integrity is assured by verifying the received 
hash code with the hash code of mobile agent code in the 
current host. While dispatching the agent the host has to 
sign the hash code for next host verification:  
 
·  RHcode= DPUi-1(EHcode)  
·  Hcode= H(Agent Byte Code)  
·  Verify if RHcode equals to Hcode or not  
1.35. Authentication  
Authentication  is  provided  for  data  and  the  mobile 
code through the private key encryption. The host where 
the  mobile  agent  migrates  authenticates  the  data 
computed  on  its  platform  and  the  hash  code  of  the 
mobile code by its private key encryption: 
  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
i PU0 i i+1 PRi i i-1 i
code PRi code
ED = E   S  S Sig D  H D OD
EH  = E   H
 
1.36. Anti-Insertion-Attack  
One  host  cannot  access  the  data  of  another  host. 
Also  the  host  can  neither  insert  nor  modify  the  data 
collected from the previous host because in each host 
the collected data is encrypted by host’s private key and 
the originator public key. Mainly chained hash values 
are generated to avoid anti insertion attack i.e., previous 
and current offers were put together to find hash value 
of current host: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
i PU0 i i 1 PRi i i 1 i
i i i
ED E   S S Sig D  H D OD
OD ED ||  H ED
+ - =
=  
1.37. Truncation Resilience 
The chain of encapsulated offer could not be broken 
in  between  the  colluded  malicious  hosts  due  to  the 
cloning and return of mobile agent in between them.  
1.38. Malicious Host Identification  
The originator could identify the malicious host by 
verifying the chain of encapsulated offer: 
  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
i PU0 i i 1 PRi i i 1 i
i i i
ED  E   S S Sig D  H D  OD
OD ED ||  H ED
+ - =
=
 
1.39. Availability  
1.39.1. Non-Repudiation  
The host to  which the  mobile agent  has  moved on 
could  not  deny  data  results  computed  on  them  and 
agent's passing through due to digital signature on the 
data and the hash value of the mobile agent code.  
2. CONCLUSION 
Mobile agents are very much important in to today’s 
e-world.  The  protection  of  mobile  agent  data  plays  a 
major  role  in  mobile  agent  applications.  The  mobile 
agent  security  is  guaranteed  through  Clone  Return 
Process  (CRP).  Multi  colluded  truncation  attack  is 
avoided  by  partial  returning  of  data  in  between 
processing.  The  execution  time  to  collect  all  data  is 
reduced due to CRP.  
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